Most Americans, former President Donald Trump, and now the Joe Biden administration, all view China as the greatest geopolitical threat to the United States. Avril D. Haines, Biden’s new director of national intelligence, recently said last month “When it comes to espionage, [the Chinese] are an adversary.” And the recent sentencing for conspiracy to steal trade secrets and wire fraud of Chinese‐born husband and wife team Li Chen and Yu Zhou seems to, at least on the surface, justify this fear.
A dearth of workers is slowing our recovery from the economic devastation wrought by COVID-19. Overly large unemployment insurance checks, an expanded welfare state and immigration restrictions have reduced the supply of willing workers. There are 9.2 million job openings nationwide and 9.3 million people unemployed. As a result, employers are hiking prices faster than wages and the economy is recovering at a slower pace than it should. Expanding legal immigration is one way to help.
The recent U.S. Treasury’s semi-annual report on the exchange rate policies of China and other major trading partners is an exercise in intellectual gymnastics. The report reiterates that China was indeed a currency manipulator, as Treasury declared in August 2019, but then stated it has magically ceased to be one just prior to the two nations signing the “Phase One” trade deal in Washington.
The world has seen North Korea’s Kim Jong Un exactly twice since April 11. His absences have sparked intense global speculation, with highlights including multiple reports of his death or incapacitation. Korea analysts—myself included—have debated endlessly which blood relative might take over. This endless “where is Kim” talk, however, distracts from the far bigger problem at hand: What can be done about a nuclear North Korea?
Americans are about to enter the third full year of President Donald Trump’s aggressive tariff regime, which aims to promote US manufacturing, protect key industries, and prompt other nations to reduce their trade barriers. So, it’s a good time to stop and ask whether tariffs are producing the results desired by the president and other supporters of his trade policies.
After some fits and starts, Joe Biden has emerged from a crowded field as the front‐runner for the Democratic nomination. There’s still some politicking left to go, but let’s talk about what a Biden trade policy might look like if he is elected president. In this article, I’ll consider three things: (1) What Biden has said about trade during the Democratic primary campaign; (2) what the Obama administration did on trade when Biden was vice‐president; and (3) what issues Biden would face and what he might do as president (this section is very speculative!).
One of the few hopeful, “glass-half-full” thoughts I had after Donald Trump won the election in 2016 was that the new president would prove to be the best salesman of free trade since Adam Smith. No, I wasn’t so deluded to think he’d articulate the case for free trade and commit himself to removing all protectionist barriers.